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COMES THE PLAINTIFF, by and through her counsel of
record, Linda Q. Jones, and submits the following reply to
Defendants7 reply brief in the above entitled case.
ISSUES
Defendant's reply brief raises two issues:

1) Whether

or not the operation of the discovery rule and statutes of
limitations are questions of law or fact; and 2)
of the claims in this case.

The nature

In addition, Defendants7 reply

brief contains a vitally important misstatement of the
facts, upon which the Defendants rely for several of their
arguments:

Defendants describe Plaintiff as having the

knowledge and memory necessary to bring a cause of action
within one year of reaching the age of majority.

This is a

complete mischaracterization of the facts in this case.
DISCUSSION
The first issue to be clarified is whether or not the
operation of the discovery rule and statutes of limitations
are questions of law or fact.

This is a two part issue:

first, whether the discovery rule and/or particular statutes
of limitations are available to the plaintiff, is a question
of law;

Second, whether or not, on the facts of an

individual case, the discovery rule, and/or particular
4

statutes of limitations, are actually applicable are
questions of fact, to be determined by the trier of fact.
This case, in its current standing, presents a question of
law:

Are the discovery rule and the four year statute of

limitations on reckless and negligent torts available to
Plaintiff in the specific circumstances of this case?
The second issue raised by Defendants' reply concerns
the nature of the claims made.

Defendants claim that the

only causes of action alleged in Plaintiff's complaint are
criminal, and therefore the applicable statute of
limitations must be that applied to intentional torts. This
is not accurate.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges certain

criminal and tortious actions.

Plaintiff's complaint does

not state or indicate a particular theory of recovery, and,
indeed, leaves open the possibility of several different
legal theories being applied, including theories of
intentional, reckless or negligent torts.

The mere fact

that the complaint alleges criminal actions does not limit
the basis of recovery to one of intentional tort.

The

criminal code includes various forms and types of intent,
for example, the crime of negligent homicide.

In addition,

the requisite degree of intent under the criminal law and

5

the law of tort vary widely, and intent of one form or
another figures in both reckless and negligent tort.
Finally, Defendants' reply brief contains a repeated
misstatement of the facts, and it is upon this misstatement
that they rely as the conclusive fact in support of their
counter-arguments and in support of the lower court's
Dismissal (Summary Judgment).

That is the repeated

statement that Plaintiff "had the ability to file her
lawsuit at the time she turned eighteen."

(Appellees7 Brief

pp. 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24). Defendants state
that "Plaintiff has made clear that she was aware of the
alleged acts of the Defendants beyond the time when she
reached the age of majority." (Appellees7 Brief p. 10).
That statement is correct, since Plaintiff is clearly now
aware of the crimes of Defendants against her.

However, it

is equally clear, upon a complete review of the record,
including the various affidavits Plaintiff has filed in this
case, that Plaintiff was not aware of the actions of
Defendants against her at the time she turned eighteen
and/or left home to get married.

Plaintiff has neither

stated nor admitted that she had any conscious awareness of
Defendants7 actions against her until the late 19807s.
Instead, Plaintiff has repeatedly stated and claimed that
6

she had so deeply repressed those memories that she was
completely unaware, at any conscious level, of the lengthy
history of abuse she had suffered at Defendants' hands.
Plaintiff states in her Affidavit In Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss that when her husband asked her, some time after
they were married, why her family treated another sister so
badly Plaintiff honestly replied that it was because that
sister "had made up lies about the family."

(Plaintiff's

Affidavit In Opposition of Motion to Dismiss, p. 2.)
Plaintiff has also specifically stated that she had no
conscious recollection of Defendants7 actions until she was
able, in 1990, to obtain competent psychological help in
processing and dealing with what she had believed were
unreal nightmares.

(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss, pp. 2-4.)

(Affidavit In Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss of Ruth Killpack.)

It was not until she obtained

this help that she was able to bring her repressed mental
record of the events into conscious awareness, to
consciously remember at least some of the incidents of abuse
which she had been so successful at repressing for most of
her life, and recognize that she had been grievously harmed.
Defendants rely on their misstatement of Plaintiff's
condition to argue that she did have a remedy within the
7

time period granted by the statute of limitations, and that
because this remedy was available, application of the
statute is not irrational, unjust, or unconstitutional under
either the Utah or the United States constitutions.
Relying, as they do, on this vital misstatement of the case,
it is clear that on the real facts, every counter-argument
they have offered must of necessity fail.

The cases they

have cited in support of upholding the lower court's
dismissal of this case, Whatcott v. Whattcott. 790 P.2d 578,
(Utah App. 1990), and the two California cases, Snyder v.
Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 205 Cal. App.3d, 253 Cal. Rptr.
156 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1988); review deniedf 1989; and De
Rose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011
(Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1987); review denied, 1988, are all
predicated upon their version of the facts: i.e., that
Plaintiff had complete conscious memory of her abuse at the
hands of Defendants.

These cases are inapplicable to the

real circumstances of this case, where Plaintiff had
completely repressed all conscious knowledge and memory of
that abuse.

Indeed, this court, in its most recent decision

in this area, stated specifically that "this is not a case
where the victim has so repressed the memory of the events
that he or she has forgotten they occurred."
8

O'Neal v.

Division of Family Services, 168 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, at 7.
This is that case:

Defendants7 actions against Plaintiff

were so unthinkable, and occurred repeatedly over such an
extended period of time, that Plaintiff, as a small child
and later as a teenager and adult, had unconsciously
defended herself in the only way available to her—by her
inability to remember or recognize the reality of those
actions.
CONCLUSION
To deny this Plaintiff, in these circumstances, the
availability of the discovery rule, would be to deny her
every legal remedy.

This would be a clear violation, as

shown in Plaintiff's brief before this court, of her rights
under the Utah and the United States constitutions.

For

these reasons, and the other reasons argued in Plaintiff's
original brief, the Order of Dismissal from the court below
should be reversed, and this case remanded for trial on the
,

merits.

JO J *

DATED this^^y

day of September^ 1991.
Q. Jpnes
ibrney for Plaintiff
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